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Evidence History, the New Trace Evidence, and
Rumblings in the Future of Proof
Robert P. Mosteller*
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper is in two parts. The first part is about developments in the rules of
evidence and particularly about developments in the Federal Rules of Evidence,
which have had a major impact on evidence rules in many states. This part turns
out to be largely about the past because my sense is that the impact of changes in
the formal rules of evidence, which were substantial, are largely historic. In one
area, however, significant future changes in the formal rules seem possible: those
that may be made as a result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v.
Washington,1 which dramatically changed confrontation and may unleash hearsay
reformulation.
The second part deals with my sense that technological and scientific
advances may have a dramatic impact in altering the way cases, particularly
criminal cases, are proved and evaluated in the future. For example, the
development and proliferation of a new type of “trace evidence”—electronic “trace
evidence”—is providing dispositive proof in a larger and larger group of cases. As
jurors come to understand such dispositive proof exists in many cases, they may
come to expect it in all, potentially changing how proof in criminal cases is
evaluated. Of course, these possibilities—these rumblings in the future of proof—
are speculative. However, there are reasons at least to suspect that, as a result of
the accumulation of events brought on by scientific and technological
developments, important changes both in the type of evidence offered and the way
it is evaluated are beginning to occur that differ in kind from the past.

*
Chadwick Professor of Law, Duke University. I would like to thank Professors Ken Broun,
Daniel Capra, David Faigman, Roger Park, Elizabeth Gibson, and Andy Taslitz for their helpful ideas
and suggestions; Justin Diamant for his assistance with the research; and the judges of the Ohio
Judicial Conference, where this paper was first presented, for their comments.
1
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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II. THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE—PRIMARILY AN EXAMINATION
OF THE PAST

A. The Major Event of Developing a National Model for Evidence Rules
Prior to the Federal Rules of Evidence, which were enacted in 1975, efforts at
evidence rulemaking had been largely unsuccessful.2 The first major effort was by
the Commonwealth Fund, whose report was published in 1927.3 It was reformist,
claimed to be empirically based, and was designed to enhance the control of trial
judges and curtail the power of lawyers in what it described as a scientific search
for the truth. The report had little effect, except that it influenced the development
of the modern business records exception to the hearsay rule.
In 1939, the American Law Institute began its project to create a Model Code
of Evidence. Professor Edmund Morgan was its Reporter. This proposal, which
was published in 1942,4 went nowhere, much like the Commonwealth Fund Report
before it. One explanation was that it put too much discretion in the hands of trial
judges, but overall the explanation for its lack of impact was the poor salesmanship
of Professor Morgan. He tended to challenge and frighten the bar and bench,
presenting the evidence proposal as just a part of a larger reform effort.5 Professor
Eileen Scallen suggests that Morgan failed to understand the relatively
conservative nature of lawyers when it comes to trial procedures.6
The Model Code did become the basis of the effort by the Commissioners of
National Conference on Uniform State Laws to draft Uniform State Laws on
Evidence. Significantly, however, the Commissioners redirected the goal toward
“acceptability and uniformity,” rather than reform.7 The first set of Uniform
Evidence Rules was issued in 1953 with modest effect, being adopted only in
Kansas, New Jersey, and Utah.8
There seemed to be a catch-22 to efforts to create and enact new evidence
rules. If they made no real changes, the reaction was: Why adopt them? On the
other hand, if they changed the law, some group of lawyers who had an interest
harmed by the proposal rose up in opposition. Uniformity of rules of evidence
2
See generally 21 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE
PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE §§ 5005–5006 (1977) (detailing evidentiary rules developments in the
twentieth century and through the drafting of the federal rules); Eileen A. Scallen, Analyzing “The
Politics of [Evidence] Rulemaking,” 53 HASTINGS L.J. 843, 847–56 (2002) (sketching the history of
evidence reform efforts).
3
EDMUND M. MORGAN ET AL., THE LAW OF EVIDENCE: SOME PROPOSALS FOR ITS REFORM
(1927).
4
21 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5005, at 84–86.
5
Scallen, supra note 2, at 849.
6
Id. at 851.
7
21 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5005, at 90.
8
Scallen, supra note 2, at 851.
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across the states was not highly valued by most lawyers. Perhaps professors at
national law schools and large law firms with multi-state practices cared, but most
lawyers did not. So the call to national uniformity by itself had little appeal.
The motivating force to enact rules of evidence would in the end come from
the federal courts. In 1963, the Judicial Conference of the federal courts
recommended the creation of Federal Rules of Evidence. Several years later, Chief
Justice Earl Warren appointed the Advisory Committee, with Professor Edward
Cleary as its Reporter. The Advisory Committee was carefully balanced with
representatives from a large number of different types of practices; it had special
emphasis on trial lawyers and judges; and it was a generally conservative group.
The preliminary draft was created over the course of the next four years with
the bulk of the work performed by Professor Edward Cleary. It was made public
in 1969. When the Supreme Court received the revised rules from the Judicial
Conference a year later, rather than sending them directly to Congress under the
Rules Enabling Act, it sent them back to the Judicial Conference to be published
for comment. This move drew the attention of Congress, produced objections
from a group of Senators, and brought about the incorporation of a number of
changes proposed by the Justice Department. The proposed rules were finally
transmitted to Congress in 1972.
The proposed rules on privilege drew a particularly negative reaction from
Congress.
With the Watergate scandal unfolding, these rules expanded
governmental privileges, which understandably was not popular at the time.
Additional issues were also raised, such as what appeared to be excessive influence
by a Justice Department hierarchy that was viewed with suspicion. The upshot
was that in 1973, Congress passed a law that the rules of evidence could not take
effect until expressly approved by Congress.9
In this process, the proposed privilege rules were dropped in favor of Rule
501, which left the rules of privilege to legislation or common law development.
Basically, the judgment of the supporters of the rules was that either there could be
rules of evidence that did not contain privilege rules, or no rules at all. Some of
the concern was that the federal rules had the substantive effect of altering state
privilege law in diversity cases. Rule 501 also accommodated that concern by
deferring generally to state privileges in such cases.
In January 1975, Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence.10 To date,
forty-two states have adopted rules of evidence based generally on the federal rules
and the Uniform Rules,11 which have largely tracked the then-existing federal
model since the initial federal draft in 1969.12
9
10
11

Act of Mar. 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93–12, 87 Stat. 9 (1973).
Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93–595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975).
6 WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, TABLE OF STATE AND MILITARY ADAPTATIONS (2d ed.

2005).
12
Scallen, supra note 2, at 851−52 (noting that while initially following the federal model
rather closely, the uniform rules have begun to diverge somewhat more in recent years from the
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What seems to have been persuasive was that, while most lawyers do not have
multi-state practices and so care little about cross-state uniformity, requiring
knowledge of two sets of rules within the same state seemed too much. Perhaps
more important was that the federal rules successfully codified in a usable form
largely familiar doctrines and procedures developed under the common law. The
rules seemed helpful and did not prove that threatening or difficult to learn and
use. As more states adopted them, they also developed momentum as the largely
national standard.
While the federal rules may have been largely a statement of the progressive
common law at the time, enacting a set of rules had one significant impact that I
see as conservative in nature: with codified rules enacted by the legislature, rather
than judge-made rules of common law origin, the concept of “plain meaning”
analysis applies. As to an integrated statute, plain meaning analysis tells us that its
language is to be followed without examination of legislative history or policy
unless the result is absurd or inconsistent with other provisions of the same
statute.13
Under this analysis, the Supreme Court ruled in Huddleston v. United States14
that “other crimes evidence” under Rule 404(b) need only be proved by sufficient
evidence such that the jury could find the fact, not a determination of clear and
convincing evidence by the trial judge, which most federal circuits and many states
had required prior to the enactment of codified rules.15 The effect of plain meaning
analysis has been to reduce the impact of policy on judicial interpretation of the
rules of evidence and to make them somewhat more wooden and fixed in
application. I see a clear difference when reading federal privilege cases in the
flexibility of application permitted if the apparent operation of the “rule” is
inconsistent with the purpose of the privilege. Since there are no codified federal
privilege rules and thus plain meaning analysis does not apply, the federal trial and
appellate courts are much freer to use policy to correct what they perceive would
otherwise be inappropriate outcomes.
federal rules, such as by the uniform rules omitting Federal Rules 413−415).
13
See generally Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence After
Sixteen Years—The Effect of “Plain Meaning” Jurisprudence, the Need for an Advisory Committee
on the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for Selective Revision of the Rules, 142 F.R.D. 519 (1992);
Randolph N. Jonakait, The Supreme Court, Plain Meaning, and the Changed Rules of Evidence, 68
TEX. L. REV. 745 (1990).
Others have noted another conservative feature of codification. After codification, the common
law rulemaking powers of judges are restricted in a system where the creation of “rules” is
principally not the responsibility of judges. See Paul R. Rice, Advisory Committee on the Federal
Rules of Evidence: Tending to the Past and Pretending for the Future?, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 817, 819
(2002) (arguing that this shift has negatively changed the dynamic of how evidentiary rules develop).
14
485 U.S. 681 (1988).
15
See, e.g., United States v. Weber, 818 F.2d 14, 14 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Vaccaro, 816 F.2d 443, 452 (9th Cir. 1987). See generally United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d. 898
(5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (discussing in the majority the different approach taken after passage of
Federal Rules of Evidence and in the dissent the prior pattern in other circuits).
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Since the federal rules were adopted, the rules have remained relatively stable
and further systemic reform has not occurred, although cumulatively there have
been a substantial number of amendments over the years. Several rules have been
added. In 1978, Congress adopted Rule 412, the rape shield law, which somewhat
surprisingly was not part of the original rules but developed in concept in the
states. In 1995, over the objection of the Judicial Conference and the Evidence
Advisory Committee, Congress also enacted Rules 413–415, which admit the
defendant’s propensity evidence shown through past criminal sexual acts. Rule
804(b)(6), which admits hearsay evidence through “forfeiture by wrongdoing,”
was added in 1997.
Changes of note have been made in Rules 701, 702, and 703 (codifying
Daubert16 principles and other restrictions on expert testimony); Rule 404 (minor
modifications of proof of the character of the accused and victim in criminal
cases); Rule 407 (minor modifications of restriction on use of subsequent remedial
measures and application to product liability cases); Rule 410 (restricting exclusion
of failed criminal plea negotiations to those involving negotiations with
government attorneys, etc.);17 Rule 609 (revising balancing tests for impeachment
with criminal convictions);18 Rule 704 (restricting opinion on ultimate issue going
to mental state in criminal cases);19 Rule 801(d)(2) (modifying proof of vicarious
admissions);20 Rules 803(6), 902(11), 902(12) (admissibility of business records
by certification); and Rule 807 (consolidation of the catchall exceptions into one
rule and renumbering it).21
Although some notable individual additions have been made, the rules in their
basic structure and substance are largely unchanged since their enactment.
Certainly, there has been nothing that would be termed a systemic revision or
substantial law reform in the intervening years.
16

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
The rule was amended in 1980 to require that covered plea negotiations be held with an
attorney for the prosecuting authority, which was intended to rectify an interpretation of the earlier
language that arguably excluded interrogations by investigating officers that touched on a potential
guilty plea. See Fed. R. Evid. 410 advisory committee’s note to 1980 amendment.
18
This change was made by Congress largely to “correct” the result reached by the Supreme
Court in Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504 (1989).
19
This change was enacted by Congress in the aftermath of the unpopular jury decision to
find John Hinkley not guilty by reason of insanity for his assassination attempted on President
Ronald Reagan. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 232 (1984), as repreinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,
3414 (giving legislative history).
20
These modifications were made to respond to and to codify the rulings of the Supreme
Court in Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
21
In addition, proposed changes from the Advisory Committee in Rule 408 to prohibit
impeachment use and to clarify the rule’s application in criminal cases have reached the Supreme
Court and in Rule 609 to clarify how courts are to determine when criminal convictions of a witness
that may involve deceit are to be so considered, which renders them automatically admissible to
impeach. These changes and several other minor changes are likely to become effective in December
2006.
17
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One reason for the absence of truly major changes is that the Supreme Court
disbanded the Evidence Advisory Committee after enactment of the rules. Unlike
the rules of civil and criminal procedure, where advisory committees have
continued in existence throughout the period, the Supreme Court apparently
thought writing the rules of evidence had been completed. Even after being
reconstituted in 1992, the Evidence Advisory Committee has not been about law
reform or an activist agenda. One reason is that then Chief Justice Rehnquist gave
directions to the chairs of all the advisory committees that he wanted only
revisions necessary to rectify clear problems, not law reform. Committee members
and critics of their relative inaction agree they have taken a view that “if it ain’t
broke don’t fix it.”22 Some committee members are also somewhat fearful that if
they propose major changes they may provoke Congress to recommend politically
inspired alternatives.
At its January 2002 meeting, the program of the Evidence Section of the
Association of American Law Schools focused on the politics of evidence
rulemaking. The clear message from the program’s panel, which included some
past and present participants on the Advisory Committee, was that there are no
plans to change this general picture of incremental and modest change.
The immediate plans for the Advisory Committee concern issues that are
substantial, but they do not envision expansive treatment of those issues. One item
is a project to suggest possible codification of rules of privilege. Congress was
fervently opposed to codification of privilege rules in 1975, and I doubt the picture
has changed. In any case, the effort is not seen as groundbreaking, but more on the
order of writing into rule form for the federal courts the current common law
understanding of the basic privileges and resolving some of the conflicts that have
developed in the federal courts’ treatment of them.23 These proposals, if adopted
some years from now, should have little effect on the states, which have often
established evidentiary privileges rules either as part of their evidence rules or by
separate legislation.
A second proposed project is to deal with technological developments in the
presentation of evidence. As I will discuss in the second part of this paper, the
impact of science and technology on the presentation of evidence is becoming
enormous, with the promise of even greater impact in the future. However, the
changes envisioned by the Advisory Committee for the formal evidence rules are
very modest. The immediate changes will likely only involve modifications of
terminology to incorporate the term “electronically stored information” into the
rules at appropriate places.
The third type of change, which in a broader form is the subject of my next
topic, is to conform the hearsay rules to the new confrontation doctrine once the
22

See Rice, supra note 13, at 820−26 (criticizing what Professor Rice sees as inappropriate
inaction rather than modernizing the rules and preparing them for the future).
23
See Kenneth S. Broun, Giving Codification a Second Chance—Testimonial Privileges and
the Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 769 (2002).
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full implications of Crawford v. Washington are known.24 As discussed below,
Crawford may provoke very significant hearsay reformulations, but I doubt they
will first occur in the federal courts or the Federal Rules of Evidence.
What are the general prospects for the future impact of changes in the Federal
Rules of Evidence? My view is that unlike what happened in 1975, there is little
reason to believe that the federal drafters and the federal rules will lead the march
in future modifications. This situation could, however, change if Chief Justice
were to direct a more activist role for the Advisory Committee.25 I suspect such a
change in direction is unlikely, but not unthinkable with respect to hearsay
reformulation.
An additional reason that the federal sector is not likely to be the leader in
systemic changes is that Congress has in the past insisted that it be directly
involved in major changes in evidence rules rather than leaving them to the Rules
Enabling Act procedure. Given the partisan split within Congress, it is unlikely
that a majority can be brought together on a broad scale set of changes. Too often,
specific rules excite interest groups, but broad scale reform has no fervent political
following .26
B. The Present and the Near-Term Future: The Opportunity that Crawford v.
Washington May Provide for Possible Fundamental Hearsay Rule Reformulation
I have written extensively about Crawford v. Washington previously,27 and I
will not repeat that detail here. My point is that the “old system” of Ohio v.
Roberts28 that linked the hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause very, very
24
The three elements of the agenda for the Advisory Committee described above are taken
from a conversation with Professor Daniel Capra, Reporter for the Advisory Committee, summarized
from public discussions of the Committee.
25
The confirmation hearings of Justice Roberts provide no basis to conclude he will take a
position different from Rehnquist, and if he does deviate, one would not expect a change in course in
the early years of his tenure as Chief Justice.
26
The discussion at the 2002 Evidence Section meeting indicated that changes in specific
evidence rules may draw substantial interest because they clearly help or hurt certain parties. On the
other side, no politically connected constituency supports disinterested evidence reform. Thus,
particular evidence rules may gain majority support and be enacted, but it is unlikely that anything so
sweeping as the Federal Rules of Evidence would today command majority support in Congress. See
Scallen, supra note 2, at 864–67 (analyzing the comments of several panel members about the narrow
interest of political factions in specific evidence rules that might support self-interested changes, in
contrast to little sustained interest in more general and neutral law reform).
27
See generally Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging and Ensuring
Confrontation, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 511 (2005) [hereinafter Mosteller, Encouraging and Ensuring
Confrontation]; see also Robert P. Mosteller, “Testimonial” and the Formalistic Definition—The
Case for an “Accusatorial” Fix, 20 CRIM. JUST. 14 (Summer 2005); Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford’s
Impact on Hearsay Statements in Domestic Violence and Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 71 BROOK. L.
REV. 411 (2005).
28
484 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
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closely may be completely discarded in Crawford’s wake, thereby creating
enormous potential for hearsay reformulation.
Under the Roberts regime, a Confrontation Clause challenge was satisfied if
the hearsay fell within a “firmly rooted” exception, such as an excited utterance.
An exception was “firmly rooted” if it had been in existence for a lengthy period of
time and was widely accepted in American jurisdictions. Thus, if the statement fit
within one of these “firmly rooted” exceptions, the constitutional issue was
resolved. Moreover, for that firmly rooted exception and many others, the
unavailability of the declarant was not required. Meeting the hearsay rule meant
the evidence was admissible both as a matter of evidence law and constitutional
law.
The very useful role that these well-established hearsay exceptions had in
resolving the constitutional issue under Roberts meant that no one was about to
recommend radical hearsay rule revision. Radically revised rules would obviously
not be considered “firmly rooted.” Also, unlike many European countries, we do
not have one set of evidence rules for civil cases and another for criminal cases,
notwithstanding that some of our rules apply in specific ways to the criminal
defendant or in criminal cases. We are committed to one set of rules that generally
apply to all litigation, and as a result, even though the Confrontation Clause does
not apply in civil cases, hearsay reform was not suggested even there. Thus, the
linkage between the rules of evidence and confrontation inhibited major changes in
hearsay rules.
Crawford potentially changes that picture and could make fundamental
hearsay reform possible. Crawford harshly criticized the Roberts test that resolved
confrontation challenges by measuring the trustworthiness or reliability of the
statement in accordance with hearsay theory.29 Crawford said that the purpose of
the Confrontation Clause was to prevent inquisitorial procedures and that the way
to accomplish that goal is to exclude out-of-court statements that are “testimonial.”
Satisfying that conception of the Confrontation Clause, by contrast to Roberts, has
nothing directly to do with the hearsay rules, and is effectively disconnected from
hearsay doctrine.
The only uncertainty remaining is whether the Supreme Court in a future
decision will completely destroy the “Old System” of Roberts or leave it as a
backstop.30 Crawford so ridiculed its basic rationale31 that the Court may have
29

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61–68.
Id. at 68 (stating that “[w]here nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent
with the Framers’ design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay law—as does
Roberts and as would an approach that exempted such statements from Confrontation Clause scrutiny
altogether”).
In the fall of 2005, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in two confrontation cases, Davis v.
Washington, 126 S. Ct. 547 (2005), and Hammon v. Indiana, 126 S. Ct. 552 (2005). While these two
cases should give some needed definition to the testimonial concept, neither case appears to present
the issue of the future of Roberts.
31
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61–68.
30
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difficulty leaving Roberts operative at all. Almost certainly Justice Scalia, who
wrote the Crawford opinion, would entirely overrule Roberts, but other justices
may feel differently.
If we assume an evidence world in which Roberts has been obliterated and
where retaining the traditional (firmly rooted) hearsay exceptions has no advantage
in deciding criminal cases,32 massive reformulation of the hearsay rules would be
possible. Interestingly, the initial proposal of the hearsay rules made by the Rules
Advisory Committee in 1969 and endorsed by the United States Supreme Court
was not the set of specific exceptions we have today, totaling about thirty. Instead,
it was a general rule that looked much like the present residual exception that
directed the trial court simply to evaluate the trustworthiness and necessity of the
statement and to admit or exclude based on that ad hoc determination.33
I do not know if that type of rule would be attractive to trial lawyers, who
often favor predictability over flexibility. My guess is that it would engender some
real opposition by those with vested interests in the current system, particularly
defense attorneys, who as a group generally favor rules that restrict the admission
of evidence, and especially criminal defense attorneys, who tend to fear the
exercise of judicial discretion against unloved criminals. It would bring back the
conflicts that were so prominent when the rules were first proposed—whether to
give more discretion to trial judges or more power to lawyers and control to
legislators, which also pits certainty, predictability, and complexity against
flexibility and simplicity.
My suspicion is that despite opposition some state(s) would take the plunge
and experiment on a radically simplified hearsay rule with regard to exceptions. It
is not a secret that most hearsay is ultimately admitted, and thus there is some
merit to the argument that the current complex system of exceptions imposes
needless costs. Also some empirical evidence supports the proposition that jurors
discount the value of hearsay so that it may not in fact be very much over-valued in
evidentiary effect.34
If my predictions are roughly correct, a decade from now some states will be
32
See Thomas J. Reed, Crawford v. Washington and the Irretrievable Breakdown of a Union:
Separating the Confrontation Clause from the Hearsay Rule, 56 S.C. L. REV. 185 (2004) (arguing
that Crawford has accomplished the separation of a union that Professor Reed argues was fatally
flawed from the beginning).
33
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts and
Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161, 345 & 377 (1969) (using similar elements for two rules, one where
unavailability is not required and the other where it is). What constitutes our specific exceptions
were listed in the rules, but they were given as examples of the types of statements that would meet
their requirements, id. at 345–50 & 377–78, not as exceptions. The general structure was thus much
like current Rule 901. See Mosteller, Encouraging and Ensuring Confrontation, supra note 27, at
520–21 (discussing possible dramatic impact of Crawford on the future of hearsay).
34
See Peter Miene et al., Juror Decision Making and the Evaluation of Hearsay Evidence, 76
MINN. L. REV. 683 (1992) (examining empirical evidence that jurors discount the value of hearsay
evidence, which the authors argue should make receiving hearsay at least somewhat less
problematic).
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experimenting with fundamental hearsay rule reformulation. Later, if a consensus
seemed to be developing that the experiment had succeeded, the federal rules
might adopt such a pattern.
III. THE UNCERTAIN LONGER-TERM FUTURE: THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY AND
SCIENCE UPON THE PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE AND THE PROOF OF CASES
The most far-reaching concern of this essay is also its most uncertain. That is
the enormous impact that I believe technology and science will have in various
ways on the presentation of evidence in the courtroom, the development of
evidence in the outside world, and the appreciation and evaluation of evidence by
juries. This discussion is not directed at rules of evidence per se and certainly not
at the federal rules. It is about evidence broadly conceived and future trends,
particularly in criminal cases.
I intend my suggestions to be provocative and thereby to encourage readers to
construct their own vision of how the future of proof may be affected by the types
of changes that I examine. In the end, I do not reach a clear conclusion about
evidence law changes. I suspect that the precise shape of predictions, like most
efforts to predict the future and particularly those that are at all ambitious, may be
a bit off target. What I mainly seek to accomplish in this part is to bring together
some developing trends and suggest a possible view of how in the future they may
affect the way cases are proved.
A. Technological Impact on the Presentation of Evidence in the Courtroom
With increasing force, computers, digital evidence, and computer-generated
exhibits are making their way into the courtroom. Either through court-provided
technology or using that of the parties, various new methods of displaying data
electronically to juries and judges are becoming available. In addition, technology
provides opportunities for video conferencing and for presenting witnesses from
off-site locations or for holding hearings with some of the parties at different
locations.
All of these changes present evidentiary issues and costs and benefits.
Authentication, best evidence, and hearsay issues regarding such evidence are
certainly real, but they do not seem to have caused great difficulty or to have been
treated by the courts as qualitatively different than with more traditional forms of
evidence. Indeed, since much evidence that ultimately is presented on paper
existed at some time as computer-stored data, there is often a commonality of
issues between “traditional” and digital evidence.
I do not mean to say that this is not an interesting or a complicated set of
issues or that it does not call for legal changes. For example, in 1998, Maryland
added a provision to its Rules of Civil Procedure35 that drew attention for
35

MD. R.P. 2-504.3.
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beginning to define and deal with computer-generated evidence.36 It requires
notice of intent to introduce such evidence and establishes a procedure for
litigating admissibility.
The rule represents a helpful step in managing
37
admissibility decisions.
Those of us who began our careers decades ago when this type of technology
was unknown or in its infancy, face challenges in being open to such new methods
of presenting evidence. However, an expanding set of materials has grown up to
help lawyers utilize this technology and to a lesser degree assist judges in ruling on
admissibility.38 Even without special aids, my instinct is that judges can rule on
these matters effectively through the exercise of basic principles.
Often, the most important issue for judges is how to let the parties prove their
cases effectively using new technology without distorting the cases or unfairly
favoring one side. Resolving these challenges are matters of judgment and
sensitive application for Rule 403.39 Other important questions concern whether
the evidence in an electronic medium is introduced into evidence or is simply used
as a method of displaying the underlying traditional evidence to the jury. This
distinction regarding formal admission is important to whether the evidence can be
36
See Fred Galves, Where the Not-So-Wild Things Are: Computers in the Courtroom, the
Federal Rules of Evidence, and the Need for Institutional Reform and More Judicial Acceptance, 13
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 161, 261–63 (2000).
37
Presently pending before the Committee on Practices and Procedures (“Standing
Committee”) of the Federal Judicial Conference are amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure that deal with electronically stored information. The amendments affect Civil Rules 11,
26, 33, 34, 37 and 45.
38
See, e.g., EOGHAN CASEY, DIGITAL EVIDENCE AND COMPUTER CRIME: FORENSIC SCIENCE,
COMPUTERS, AND THE INTERNET (2d ed. 2004); PIKE & FISHER, INC., DIGITAL DISCOVERY & EEVIDENCE: BEST PRACTICES AND EVOLVING LAW (2005); MICHELE C.S. LANGE & KRISTIN M.
NIMSGER, ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE AND DISCOVERY: WHAT EVERY LAWYER SHOULD KNOW (ABA
2004); THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR FORENSIC SCIENCE, DIGITAL EVIDENCE IN THE COURTROOM: A
GUIDE FOR PREPARING DIGITAL EVIDENCE FOR COURTROOM PRESENTATION (2003); PAUL R. RICE,
ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE: LAW AND PRACTICE (ABA 2005); Galves, supra note 36; Fredric L. Lederer,
Trial Advocacy: The Road to the Virtual Courtroom? A Consideration of Today’s—and
Tomorrow’s—High-Technology Courtrooms, 50 S.C. L. REV. 799 (1999); Mark D. Robins, Evidence
at the Electronic Frontier: Introducing E-Mail at Trial in Commercial Litigation, 29 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 219 (2003); Criminal Justice Magazine, Volume 19 (Spring 2004) (devoting
entire issue to new technology evidence); Symposium: International Conference on the Legal and
Policy Implications of Courtroom Technology, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 637–938 (2004).
39
I am implicitly taking the position here that the use of technology to enhance the
presentation of evidence is not inherently different in terms of potential prejudice than other types of
evidence. In general, that seems a sound assessment.
Another type of concern is whether the increased use of sophisticated technology will
exacerbate the gap between adversaries with unequal resources. See Galves, supra note 36, at 290–
91. Rarely is this a matter that should affect admissibility, but it is a concern for the justice system.
However, if courts provide the technology and thus provide access for parties with limited resources,
that gap may be reduced somewhat or even eliminated. See Michael E. Heintz, Note, The Digital
Divide and Courtroom Technology: Can David Keep Up with Goliath?, 54 FED. COMM. L.J. 567,
586–88 (2002).
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used easily during closing argument and whether it goes to the jury during its
deliberations.40
B. Effect of Technology on the Proof of Disputed Fact
The available evidence tends to determine how disputed facts are proved in
the courtroom. In many ways, such proof has remained relatively unchanged for
several hundred years. However, there is some suggestion that through accretion
of scientific and technological advances proof of contested facts, particularly in
criminal cases, and courts’ and jurors’ appreciation of such evidence may be
changing in a fundamental way. The items that I will note may be disjunctive, but
I believe they have some common threads that are having a major cumulative
impact.
My insights are both practically and theoretically driven. Before becoming an
academic, I had substantial experience in trial work. I spent seven years as a
public defender at the Washington, D.C. Public Defender Service where I tried
criminal cases, including a number of homicides, and ultimately as Chief of the
Trial Division, consulted throughout the office on a broad range of my colleagues’
cases. The cases I saw were part of the gritty world of ordinary criminal litigation.
Most of the evidence consisted of the perceptions and memories of ordinary
citizens, buttressed from time to time by basic forensic evidence, such as
fingerprints, serology, autopsies, and ballistics. This was not the super high-tech
world that intrudes into cases with greater frequency today. Certainly, many
criminal cases will continue, like the ones I saw up close, to be based largely on
such ordinary evidence.
1. Who “Done It?”: The Creation of More “Trace” Evidence and Magnifying
Its Impact
Increasingly, we see the use of technological and scientific evidence in a
growing range of criminal cases to show who is the perpetrator. Videotapes or
pictures of actual events in criminal cases were almost never part of criminal cases
two decades ago. They are more and more a part of cases today with the ubiquity
of various types of recording systems. Recordings may be made by surveillance
cameras in stores, at ATMs, and on street corners, or by pictures made by
passersby who more frequently today have video cameras and picture phones as
they walk and drive about. Others leave behind evidence trails in e-mails or
physical trails of their travels by automobile electronic pass information.41
40
See Brian Carney & Neal Feigenson, Visual Persuasion in the Michael Skakel Trial:
Enhancing Advocacy through Interactive Media Presentations, 19 CRIM. JUST. 22, 28–29 (Spring
2004) (commenting on the effective use of video during the prosecution’s closing argument and
debating the issues of how best to allow jurors to view admitted video evidence during deliberations).
41
I observe that some young people appear almost constantly in communication through cell
phones and instant messaging. That gives rise to more admissible hearsay under Rule 803(1), which
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In general, new types of “trace” evidence, which is not physical trace
evidence like fingerprints or DNA, but recordings of actions and motions, are
being created that did not exist at previous times. The chances are growing that
crimes committed in public places will have some part of them on film and that
versions of events given by suspects and witnesses will have elements that can be
corroborated or refuted by electronic trace evidence. Stories should have points of
corroboration or contradiction that were not available earlier, and the growth of
these unknown and unanticipated sources of evidence makes it somewhat more
difficult for false claims to succeed. In a number of recent national crime stories,
the original version of events given by either a possibly guilty perpetrator42 or a
bogus victim was rather conclusively refuted.43
Also, the growing power of computers, the digitizing of evidence, and the
development of sophisticated search technology have allowed for far more
effective use of the trace evidence that is discovered. DNA analysis is possible
with smaller amounts of material than earlier forms of the technology required.
“Cold hits” occur, whereby completely unknown suspects are identified by
computer searches that match fingerprint fragments and DNA profiles. These
processes were at one time totally impractical because of computing limitations,
and one must assume they will become ever more common as technological
capacity advances.
A different, but perhaps related, development has been the “innocence
movement” that has grown out of the use of DNA evidence principally in death
penalty cases but is having some impact in other types of serious criminal cases.
This type of “proof of innocence”44 demonstrated errors in criminal convictions of
requires contemporaneous communication of observations. I predict that this exception, which has
been used relatively little in the past because most ordinary events are not communicated
contemporaneously to others, see JOHN W. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 271 (5th ed. 1999),
will be used more frequently as a larger percentage of ordinary events are routinely narrated as part of
an almost continuous series of conversations.
In addition, technologies such as picture phones, rather than relying on human description and
memory, not only generate a digital image, but also create a digital record of that observation that is
stored in a relatively long-lasting data bank. This type of “observation” can very easily be displayed
as powerful recorded evidence of the event.
42
See Possible Break in Disappearance of Student in Aruba, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2005, at
A10 (reporting that the story of three men suspected of kidnapping Natalee Holloway in Aruba was
undercut when security cameras at the hotel where the suspects said they left Ms. Holloway did not
show her return).
43
See Lisa Donovan, Woman Admits to Hoax, DULUTH NEWS TRIBUNE, Apr. 3, 2004, at 1A
(describing unraveling of story by victim of nationally publicized kidnapping hoax, who admitted to
staging the event after videotape at store showed her buying a knife, duct tape, rope, and other items
allegedly used by perpetrator, and her home computer revealed that shortly before the alleged
abduction she had used it to find the location of wooded areas near her residence and to access the
five-day weather forecast that covered the period of her alleged kidnapping).
44
I do not claim that DNA evidence that does not show guilt is the same as proof of
innocence. There are reasons why the failure to find the defendant’s DNA may not mean that he or
she is innocent—for example an unknown person may have left the DNA while the defendant left
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the most serious type that cannot be discounted. The reversal in formal assessment
of guilt happened because trace evidence that could not be tested at the time the
cases were tried was preserved and could be tested by later-developed DNA
technology. In many cases, DNA evidence confirmed the fallibility of eyewitness
identification evidence, which was always theoretically suspect. However, DNA
showed with scientific certainty that such identifications can sometimes be dead
wrong.
The result of these cases has been to encourage calls for higher standards for
the proof of guilt. Some proposals include better procedures for conducting the
showing of photos for identification procedures in criminal cases;45 videotaping
interrogations of the suspects in serious cases; and imposing certification
procedures on forensic labs that analyze trace evidence. This movement dovetails
with one of the likely lasting results of Daubert—a demand either that scientific
and technological claims be shown to be valid or that the evidence be excluded.46
I am not sure anything unique is happening here. The burden of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt in criminal cases was always designed to make false
convictions far more difficult to obtain than false acquittals.47 What may be
developing, however, is a growing skepticism of convictions obtained without
corroborating trace evidence.
Finally, there is some anecdotal evidence at least to suggest jurors may be
acquiring an unrealistic expectation of the certainty that scientific forensic
evidence may provide. I want to use here what I take as mainly a metaphor rather
than a causative agent. This is what some call the “CSI effect.”48 CSI, which
stands for Crime Scene Investigation, is now an ever-expanding series of very
popular television shows that air on CBS in which crimes are solved by use of
sophisticated forensic tools.
The message of the series is that dispositive forensic evidence almost always
exists to prove the guilt of the true perpetrator and to exculpate the innocent. It is a
modern day version of Perry Mason’s cross-examination when the guilty party had
no alternative but to confess under Perry’s examination. In CSI, frequently the
none.
45

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STATEMENT OF BEST PRACTICES FOR PROMOTING THE
ACCURACY OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES (Aug. 2004), available at
http://www.abanet.org/leadership/2004/annual/dailyjournal/111c.doc.
46
Cf. Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study of
Scientific Admissibility Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471, 503–05 (2005) (arguing that Daubert has had
an effect not only on states that adopted that standard but on Frye states as well in causing judges to
be more restrictive in admitting scientific evidence in civil cases).
47
William Blackstone made the well-known statement, “[I]t is better that ten guilty persons
escape, than that one innocent suffer.” 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF
ENGLAND 358.
48
See Boatswain v. State, No. 408-2004, 2005 WL 1000565 (Del. Apr. 27, 2005) (concluding
that the prosecutor’s closing argument that, unlike on CSI, finding no fingerprints did not mean the
defendant was not guilty, improperly diminished the state’s burden).
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same result occurs after the test comes back and conclusively identifies the
perpetrator.
As yet, only the intuition of trial lawyers49 and judges50 suggests the impact of
this phenomenon on the expectations of jurors. In cases I tried, fingerprints were
only rarely found because, at least with the recovery technology of that era,
useable fingerprints were often not left on surfaces that could be effectively
processed. The growing use of more sophisticated techniques and the overstatement of their effectiveness in shows such as CSI, however, may produce a
different reaction in jurors today. In my day, jurors seemed quite willing to accept
that fingerprints were hard to find. Whether that is the mindset today, I am not so
sure. Moreover, as more and more trace evidence is developed and analyzed more
effectively, the expectation may grow that such proof must exist if guilt is to be
found.51
2. With What Intent?: Not Such Clear Progress, but Major Possibilities for
the Detection of Lies
The advances in scientific evidence that I have been discussing largely have
affected the process of identifying the perpetrator.52 Fewer developments have
enhanced our ability to determine the intent with which action was taken, often the
key issue in determining whether a crime occurred (e.g., rape, when sexual
intercourse clearly occurred and the parties know each other, or whether a killing
was committed in self-defense) or in setting the level of the offense (the grading of
homicides between first-degree and second-degree murder and manslaughter).
There are, however, indications that new technology may have an enormous
impact here as well. New technology promises major advances in lie detection,
which with its potential to solve these problems of intent may unsettle much of our
current understanding of fact-finding through trials.

49
See Michael Watkins, Forensics in the Media (2005) (unpublished study, on file with the
author) (describing empirical research indicating that lawyers believe CSI has altered juror
perceptions and describing the resulting changes in lawyer behavior).
50
When I presented this paper to the Ohio Judicial Conference in September 2005 to several
hundred judges the point I made that received the most reaction was the CSI effect. The judges
reported in comments both at the public session and privately that they frequently see indications of
this effect in the questions and comments of jurors and that they and the lawyers trying cases spend
time acting upon the perception that the effect on jurors is real and important.
51
Perhaps we saw something of this phenomenon in the acquittal of Richard Scrushy. See
Simon Romero & Kyle Whitmire, Former Chief of HealthSouth Acquitted in $2.7 Billion Fraud,
N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2005, at A1 (reporting that one juror said, “I wanted more than just hearsay,”
and another said, “I wanted something in black and white, something like fingerprints”). It is
somewhat remarkable that a juror wanted and perhaps expected actual fingerprint evidence in a
Sarbanes-Oxley accounting fraud prosecution.
52
Trace evidence left in e-mails or on computer hard drives can show the intention of their
author as well as revealing the perpetrator’s identity.
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The promising technology that I am focusing on is functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging (fMRI).53 In addition to MRI technology that is somewhat
familiar to many of us, this technology also relies on “blood oxygenation level
dependent” (BOLD) contrast, which allows it to detect increases in brain activity.
In essence, it allows us to see what parts of the brain are being used in a task by the
test subject. The basic theory, which is being developed and validated by a
number of researchers,54 is that different parts of the brain are involved in
deception than when a person simply recalls information.55
Conceptually, this new technology promises to advance lie detection greatly
beyond the effectiveness of today’s polygraph. In contrast to functional MRI
technology, the polygraph detects the subject’s physiological reactions to
questioning, registering non-specific changes in arousal, and not the act of
deception itself. As a result, some subjects may be able to take countermeasures to
suppress the emotional response to lying. Functional MRI in essence observes the
mental activity involved in telling a lie.
Although the various uses of functional MRI are not yet clearly established,
the technology may permit testing beyond subjects who voluntarily submit to a
polygraph and answer a series of test questions. Such testing could allow a
determination, by brain activity indicating familiarity, that the subject has guilty
knowledge of some object he or she is shown.56
I do not know that we will ever achieve a technology that reliably determines
deception. Functional MRI may in the end prove no better than earlier lie
detection technologies, but it has a potential to move the process of determining
deception forward even if it does not itself reach proficiency. What would be the
consequences of developing such technology? That is indeed a difficult question.
I suggest no evidentiary and constitutional revolution. Certainly the Fifth
Amendment would stand in the way of requiring a criminal suspect to take a lie
53

See generally Sean Kevin Thompson, Note, The Legality of the Use of Psychiatric
Neuroimaging in Intelligence Interrogation, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1601, 1607–08 (2005). See also
Michael S. Beauchamp, Functional MRI for Beginners, 5 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 397, 397–98
(2002).
54
See, e.g., Frank Andrew Kozel et al., A Replication Study of Neural Correlates of
Deception, 118 BEHAVIORAL NEUROSCIENCE 852, 853−54 (2004); F. Andrew Kozel et al., A Pilot
Study of Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Brain Correlates of Deception in Healthy Young
Men, 16 J. NEUROPSYCHIATRY CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 295, 296 (2004) [hereinafter Kozel et al., A
Pilot Study]; D.D. Langleben et al., Brain Activity During Simulated Deception: An Event-Related
Functional Magnetic Resonance Study, 15 NEUROIMAGE 727, 727 (2002); Jennifer Maria Nunez et
al., Intentional False Responding Shares Neural Substrates with Response Conflict and Cognitive
Control, 25 NEUROIMAGE 267, 273−76 (2005); Sean A. Spence et al., Behavioural and Functional
Anatomical Correlates of Deception in Humans, 12 NEUROREPORT 2849 (2001).
55
See Kozel et al., A Pilot Study, supra note 54, at 296; Langleben et al., supra note 54, at
727; Tatia M.C. Lee et al., Lie Detection by Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 15 HUM.
BRAIN MAPPING 157, 158 (2002).
56
See Faye Flam, Your Brain May Soon be Used Against You, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Oct.
29, 2002, at A1.

2006]

EVIDENCE HISTORY

539

detector test or an argument or comment by the prosecutor about the suspect’s
failure to do so.57 The Fourth Amendment would likely restrict58 and Fifth
Amendment would likely prevent59 involuntary uses of functional MRIs to show
deception in criminal cases. And while some jurisdictions allow polygraph results
to be admitted by the defendant in selected circumstances, that is the minority
view.60 A more effective lie detection technology would have no direct impact on
this body of law that generally restricts its admissibility.
I do imagine, however, if there were a truly accurate lie detection technology,
over time it would have a substantial impact both on how criminal cases are
handled before trial and on how they are tried. Wouldn’t innocent defendants
submit to lie detectors and prosecutors dismiss cases when the results are favorable
to the defendant? Wouldn’t the Due Process Clause mandate admissibility for
clearly authoritative lie detector results favorable to the defendant?61 Wouldn’t
potential jurors learn of this general process and suspect that those not taking
advantage of it are guilty? I assume the impact in civil cases would be even
greater where juror knowledge of the results or the refusal to undergo the
examination would be more direct.
C. The Impact of Terrorism
No doubt our effort to prevent and punish terrorism will play a substantial role
in technological advances in detecting and solving crime. The bombings in
London during the summer of 2005 showed the use of England’s system of
surveillance cameras, the usefulness of picture phones, and the application of
advanced forensic techniques. Presumably, lessons learned regarding what proved
helpful in that investigation will be used to develop and deploy technology to meet
the continued threat of terrorism.

57

The Fifth Amendment would not impose the same restrictions on, for example, informing
the jury of a civil litigant’s refusal to submit to testing.
58
See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (requiring a warrant for use of
technology that obtains information about activities inside the home, which should impose a similar
requirement on technology that gathers information from inside the mind).
59
Cf. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 598–600 (1990) (ruling that interrogation about
date of defendant’s sixth birthday revealed mental processes covered by the Fifth Amendment).
60
See Paul C. Giannelli, Polygraph Evidence Post-Daubert, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 895 (1998)
(describing mixed results in the courts on the admissibility of polygraph evidence offered by the
defense in criminal cases). In United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 317 (1998), the Supreme Court
upheld a per se rule of exclusion of polygraph evidence even when offered by the defense. However,
Justice Kennedy, writing for four justices, stated that in a more compelling case the result might be
different. Id. at 318. He did not make any direct reference to a far more accurate lie detector
technology, but one would imagine that such technology would further support arguments by the
defense for a constitutional right to introduce such evidence.
61
See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302–03 (1973) (requiring admission of
exculpatory confession).
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Efforts to make our own country safer from terrorist attacks will surely be
separated from the efforts to prevent and solve ordinary crime. However,
techniques used in the anti-terrorism effort, such as expanded video monitoring of
public places and the cumulation and analysis of that data will likely seep into
ordinary cases and spawn the development of new identification technologies that
over time gain widespread use in ordinary criminal investigations.
D. The Overall Impact of Technological Change
How these technological trends will affect evidence rules is unclear to me and
my fuzzy crystal ball. My suspicion is that technical rules of admissibility, such as
those dealing with authentication, which currently are quite easily met, will remain
that way. The impact thus may not be so much on admissibility, but rather on
what is in fact offered and what is found to be sufficient.
Of course, I do not mean to suggest that technology will eliminate
uncertainty. That will never happen where we are trying to reconstruct the actions
and thoughts of human beings. Moreover, crime is often committed in secret.
Technology may, however, reduce the number and types of cases where real
uncertainty exists, and we may find that more cases are relatively conclusively
proved. At the same time, we may observe a greater difficulty in securing
convictions in cases that depend on the perceptions and memories of witnesses and
lack corroborating “hard evidence.”
The effects of technological advances push in two conflicting directions when
it comes to findings of guilt or innocence. On the one hand, as more types of
powerful evidence become available, many cases will become much stronger,
sometimes virtually irrefutable, and will lead to more convictions. These clearly
proved cases may reinforce a growing sense in the public to expect and sometimes
to require such types of proof, which cannot be met in many other cases where
definite scientific proof is absent.
Will the availability of certain proof in clear cases interfere with the necessary
task in many more trials for the jurors to evaluate uncertain evidence and to make
the best human judgment possible? Will it effectively change what is meant by
proof beyond a reasonable doubt? If so, courts may need at least to develop new
instructions to set a context for jury determinations in different types of cases.
IV. CONCLUSION
The history of evidence law in the last century was eventful although not
filled with dramatic changes, and I predict at least the near-term future will be
much the same. After unsuccessful efforts at law reform, the rules as adopted had
the more modest goals of uniformity and consolidation of progressive common law
trends. Their achievements in modifying the law and practice, although largely
technical, were cumulatively quite significant.
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The future of changes in evidence law per se could be even more modest.
One exception may occur in the area of hearsay reformulation. This will be
possible if the Supreme Court in a future decision turns the separation between the
protections against unreliable or untrustworthy evidence provided by the hearsay
rules and that afforded by the Confrontation Clause, which Crawford announced,
into a total break.62 I anticipate that Crawford will at least encourage more
piecemeal hearsay innovation if not a wholesale reformulation.
Proof of facts and their evaluation by juries could be enormously changed by
technological advances that are upon us. These changes are most pronounced in
the expansion of dispositive trace evidence, particularly pictorial trace evidence.
Extremely significant advances may occur in the near future on proof of deception,
which could prove even more revolutionary. Together they may change juror
expectations about the quality of proof that is available, whether or not accurate in
a particular case, and may affect when jurors are willing to convict and condemn.
My suggestions for the shape of the future depends upon my ability to foresee
that future, and for most people, including me, such “crystal ball” gazing is highly
problematic. Nevertheless, I do sense that changes that are different in kind are
beginning to affect proof and evaluation of proof, particularly in criminal cases, as
the result of the accumulation of scientific and technological changes. On that
general point, although not the specifics, I am reasonably confident. Among our
tasks in addition to anticipating the future will be the very real need to respond to
those changes as they occur. I believe it will be a very interesting evidence future
indeed.

62

This total break is marginally more likely in that the justices who cast the two votes taking
issue with the new system and supporting continuation of Roberts, Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice O’Connor, are no longer on the Court.

